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Reviving CERCIA's Liability: Why Government 
Agencies Should Recover Their Attorneys' Fees 
in Response Cost Recovery Actions 
K.JASON NORTHCUTT* 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA) imposes strict, retroactive liability on owners or 
operators of sites contaminated with hazardous waste. CERCLA also 
authorizes private parties and the Environmental Protection Agentry (EPA) 
to initiate the cleanup process and to recover the costs of that cleanup from 
the responsible party. The language of section 7 of CERCLA, however, is 
ambiguous as to whether attorneys' fees incurred in litigation to recover 
these response costs are recoverable. The Supreme Court in Key Tronic Corp. 
v. United States, held that private parties cannot recover attorneys' fees in 
such actions. Even so, the Court expressly reserved judgment on the issue of 
whether, in recovery actions taken by EPA, attorneys 'fees could be recovered. 
This 'Comment argues that the history, structure, and pU1pose of CERCLA 
all suggest that the Supreme Court should follow the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. Chapman, and hold that EPA attorneys' fees are 
recoverable as part of the response costs of cleanup. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERClA)l imposes retroactive liability on a 
broad basis and prompts environmental restoration where hazardous 
materials have been released.2 As part of its scheme, it provides a 
party or parties that clean up a release of hazardous materials an op-
portunity to recover their costs.s CERClA's provisions for governmen-
tal cost recovery and private party cost recovery are in different sub-
sections.4 Since neither cost recovery directly addresses whether 
*Solicitations Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1999-
2000. 
lComprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
2See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY, NATURE, LAw, 
AND SOCIETY 803 (2d ed. 1998). 
3See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
4See id. § 9607(a) (4) (A), (B). 
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attorneys' fees are included, it is unclear whether Congress intended 
them to be recoverable.5 Two recent cases, Key Tronic Corp. v. United 
State!> and United States v. Chapman,7 have addressed whether Congress 
intended to authorize the recovery of attorneys' fees in actions to re-
cover response costs under CERCIA.8 In Key Tronic, the Supreme 
Court held that private parties could not recover attorneys' fees in 
such an action,9 while in Chapman, the Ninth Circuit limited Key 
Tronic, holding that EPA could recover its attorneys' fees under CER-
CIA.lO This Comment argues that, in reading Key Tronic narrowly and 
awarding attorneys' fees to government agencies for their response 
costs, the Ninth Circuit has taken the correct approach because CER-
CIA's legislative history and language express an intent to award the 
government its attorneys' fees, and the policy objectives achieved by 
fee shifting further justify imposing the costs upon the responsible 
party.II 
Section I discusses fee-shifting in the United States and the 
"American Rule" presumption against shifting fees without clear legis-
lative intent to do so. Section II outlines and discusses CERCIA in 
general as well as the specific provisions that address actions to re-
cover the costs of response. Section III then addresses the case law 
that has developed with respect to the recoverability of attorneys' fees 
under CERCIA in actions to recover costs of response. Section III also 
addresses the tools of statutory interpretation that these courts relied 
upon in analyzing congressional intent. Finally, Section IV analyzes 
the case law in light of CERCIA's language, the remedial purpose 
canon of construction and legislative intent, and the public policy 
implications underlying awarding attorneys' fees to governmental 
agencies when they seek to recover their costs of response under 
CERCIA. 
I. FEE SHIFTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
When evaluating fee shifting, courts deal with two competing 
principles: (1) the American Rule generally prohibiting fee shifting 
5See id. 
6511 u.s. 809 (1994). 
7146 F.3d 1166 (1998). 
8See generally Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994); United States v. 
Chapman, 146 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1998). 
9 See Key Tronie, 511 U.S. at 819. 
IOSee Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1175. 
IISee infra IV.A-B. 
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absent express statutory authority to do so; and (2) policy objectives 
favoring fee shifting,12 
A The American Rule 
There are two fee-shifting paradigms. In the United States, each 
party must bear its own litigation costS)3 As early as 1796, the Su-
preme Court said: "The general practice of the United States is in op-
position to [awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing parties]; and even if 
that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the 
respect of the court, until it is changed, or modified, by statute."14 
This rule, known as the "American Rule," contrasts with the "loser 
pays" rule used in most modern countries where the losing party pays 
the costs associated with litigation.15 
The American judiciary has been reluctant to modify its tradi-
tional notions of allocating attorneys' fees.16 Usually, exceptions are 
legislatively created to further some specific policy)' Even when the 
statutory language and construction seem to indicate a legislative in-
tent to shift attorneys' fees, our courts have expressed reluctance to 
do SO.IS 
Although the American Rule is firmly entrenched in United 
States jurisprudence, it has several exceptions.19 For example, courts 
have awarded attorneys' fees where a statute authorizes it or where a 
contract provides for it.20 In equity, courts have shifted fees to the los-
ing party when "overriding considerations of justice seemed to com-
pel such a result. "21 
Courts have created another exception to the American Rule 
with the "private attorney general" doctrine.22 This doctrine, which 
12See Robert A. Mullins, The Aftermath of Key Tronic: Implications for Attorney's Fee Awards, 
24ENVTL.L.1513, 1528 (1994). 
13See Terry M. Miller, Comment, The Discretionary Award of Attorney's Fees Uy the Federal 
Courts: Sel£ctive Deviations from the No-Fee Rul£ and the Regrettably Brief Life of the Private Atto1'ney 
GeneraLDoctrine, 36 OHIO ST. LJ. 588, 588 (1975). 
14Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 DaB.) 306,306 (1796). 
15See Miller, supra note 13, at 591. 
16See id. at 589. 
17See Lora E. Keenan, Attorney Fees in Private Party Cost Recovery Actions Under CERLCA, 
22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 449, 451 (1995). 
18See id. at 451-52. 
19See id. at 451. 
20See id. at 453. 
21See id. (quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 
(1967) ). 
22See Miller, supra note 13, at 614. 
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broadened the exception to the American Rule in the 1960s and 
1970s, reflected a policy of encouraging socially beneficial litigation. 23 
The theory of the doctrine was that a "successful litigant can some-
times act as a 'private attorney general' by detecting statutory viola-
tions and encouraging compliance through private actions. In such 
cases, where the court is seeking to promote private enforcement, 
awarding attorneys' fees reduces the barrier to suit created by high 
litigation costs. "24 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,25 however, curtailed 
this exception.26 The Supreme Court declared that the power to es-
tablish a private attorney general exception belonged to Congress 
rather than the Judiciary.27 In the absence of express statutory author-
ity, courts were not to shift attorneys' fees based upon public policy.28 
The Court reasoned that because Congress had remained silent on 
the allocation of fees, it intended the traditional American Rule to 
apply.29 
While Aleyska supports the proposition that courts are not to shift 
fees unless the underlying statute provides for it,30 it left unanswered 
how explicit Congress needed to be to manifest its intention to shift 
fees. The Court addressed this question in Runyon v. McCrary.31 There, 
the Court focused on whether there was enough congressional intent 
to justify fee shifting.32 The plaintiffs argued that the applicable civil 
rights statute gave private parties broad authority to enforce civil 
rights.33 The Court rejected this argument because the statute con-
tained no explicit provision for fee shifting and was too "generalized" 
to be a clear indication of congressional intent to set aside the Ameri-
can Rule.34 By relying on legislative history, the Court implicitly vali-
dated the practice of looking beyond the mere words of the statute to 
determine whether enough congressional intent existed to supplant 
the American Rule.35 
23See id. at 612-13. 
24Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARV. L. REv. 411, 413 (1973). 
25Seegenerally421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
26See Miller, supra note 13, at 646. 
27 See id. at 623. 
28See Aleyska, 421 U.S. at 262. 
29See id. at 260. 
30See id. at 262. 
31427 U.S. 160, 184 (1976). 
32See id. 
33 See id. at 184-85. 
34See id. at 185-86. 
35See id. 
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B. Policy Objectives Considered in Fee Shifting 
A major criticism of the American Rule is that it prevents a large 
portion of the population from bringing lawsuits.36 For individuals 
who have no hope of recovering attorneys' fees, the legal redress 
might not be justified by the costs incurred in retaining able coun-
sel,37 Lawyers' hourly rates can be prohibitively expensive for a large 
portion of the population, especially the financially underprivileged.38 
On the other hand, contingency fee payment systems are criticized for 
encouraging counsel to accept early, lower, settlement offers ,39 
thereby depriving the aggrieved party of his or her due damages. 
Moreover, detractors of the American Rule argue that absent fee 
shifting, a wronged plaintiff often cannot be made whole again.40 
When the jury is not allowed to consider the plaintiff's lawyer'S fees in 
granting an award, the plaintiff cannot be in the same position in 
which he or she would have been had he or she not suffered a legal 
wrong.41 The English Judiciary justifies its fee-shifting rule using a 
similar rationale: because the victor incurs litigation expenses due to 
the losing party's conduct, the losing party should have to pay those 
expenses.42 
Proponents of the American Rule argue that imposing a "loser 
pays" rule deters law suits by the financially-challenged because the 
uncertainty of litigation discourages poorer plaintiffs from instituting 
actions by confronting them with the prospect of paying the defen-
dant's fees. 43 Although this may be true in very close cases, it is 
probably untrue where the plaintiff is likely to win.44 
Proponents of the American Rule also argue that a party's legal 
expenses are a function of its own strategy decisions, and the oppos-
ing party should not be held responsible for expenses it cannot con-
trol.45 These proponents believe that the uncertainty of litigation in 
U.S. courts justifies the American Rule,46 reasoning that parties 
should not be forced to abstain from bringing or defending litigation 
36See Miller, supra note 13, at 596. 
37See id. 
36See id. at 596 n.72. 
39See id. 
40See id. at 599. 
41 See Miller, supra note 13, at 599. 
42See Keenan, supra note 17, at 452-53. 
43See MilIer, supra note 13, at 599. 
44See id. 
45See Keenan, supra note 17, at 453. 
46See id. 
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due to the possibility of being penalized.47 These. competing ration-
ales surface whenever a party tries to shift attorneys' fees to a pollut-
ing party under CERClA's cost of response provisions. 
II. CERClA GENERALLY 
A. History and Goals 
CERClA was enacted in part to assuage public outrage towards 
the parties responsible for high profile releases of hazardous sub-
stances.48 One such high profile example is Love Cana1.49 The tragedy 
at Love Canal prompted the passing of CERClA in the last days of the 
Carter Administration.5o 
The legislative history of CERClA lacks clarity, making it difficult 
for the judiciary to discern the full legislative intent of the law.51 In 
1980, the bills eventually comprising CERClA were hurriedly passed 
with only limited debate over its intricacies and implementation. 52 
They were put together by a bipartisan group of senators.53 Mter the 
Senate passed the bill, it was presented to the House as an amend-
ment to a former House bill.54 The House considered and passed the 
47 See id. 
48See PLATER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 803. 
49See id. 
50See Keenan, supra note 17, at 458. CERCLA was already on its way to being drafted 
before the residents of Love Canal were exposed to carcinogenic wastes. See WILLIAM H. 
RODGERS,JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 682 (2d ed. 1994). However, few, if any, would refute 
that such incidents led to CERCLA's passage. See id. "Love Canal" was a community of ap-
proximately 100 homes and a school, built upon a site contaminated with toxic wastes. See 
United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). 
The company that sold the sixteen acres to the Niagara Falls Board of Education for one 
dollar, Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corporation, acknowledged that it had buried 
chemicals on the site and covered them with clay. See Lana Knedlik, Comment, Attorney's 
Fees in Private Party Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA: The Key Tronic Decision, 44 U. KAN. 
L. REv. 365, 366 (1996). The deed transferring ownership to the Board of Education stated 
that Hooker would be free of any liability for injuries resulting from exposure to the 
chemicals. See id. Twenty-five years later, in 1978, heavy rains caused the chemicals, many 
carcinogenic, to seep into nearby basements. See id. The government spent approximately 
$140 million to clean the site. See id. 
51Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980,8 COLUM.J. ENVTL. LAw 1, 1 (1982). In the 
Ninety-sixth Congress, the bills that contributed to the Act were H.R. 7020, H.R. 85, and S. 
1480. See id. at 2. 
52See id. 
53See id. at 1. 
54See id. 
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bill with only limited debate because the House was acting under a 
take-it-or-Ieave-it policy that allowed no amendment.55 
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA with the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) .56 The main focus of 
SARA was to effectuate faster response and subsequent cleanup.57 
SARA simultaneously re-authorized CERCLA and changed much of 
the Act.58 Because the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had 
de-listed only six sites from the National Priorities List (NPL) in the 
five years since CERCLA was passed, many of the changes enacted by 
SARA concerned EPA's authority to initiate and expedite environ-
mental restoration.59 
CERCLA creates a system for cleaning hazardous waste sites in 
order "to protect public health and the environment from dangers 
posed by [these sites]," and for holding responsible parties liable for 
the costs thereof.6o The party faced with restoring the environment or 
paying recovery costs to the government may attempt to recover its 
costs from any other Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) under 
common law doctrines of joint and severalliabilitfl and the statutory 
right of recovery provision of section 113.62 Rather than attempting to 
achieve these goals by broad regulation of the thousands of actors 
across the United States that handle hazardous substances, Congress 
chose to impose strict, joint and several liability for costs of response 
on PRPS.63 
Section 106 of CERCLA authorizes the President to issue a 
cleanup order to a PRP.64 The President may delegate this authority to 
55See id. 
56Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-
499,100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. II 1996». 
57 See Keenan, supra note 17, at 459. 
58See Kenneth F. Rossman IV, Casenote, Key Tronic Corp. v. United States: Ratifying an In-
equitable Distribution of Private Party Costs Under Superfund by Refusing to Shift Attomey s Fees, 4 
GEO.MAsoNL.REv.1l3, 117 (1995). 
59See Knedlik, supra note 50, at 36S. 
60See H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, pt. I, at 17 (I9S0), replinted in 19S0 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119-
20; see also Knedlik, supra note 50, at 367. 
61 See PLATER, ET AL., supra note 2, at S07-OS. Plater points out that Congress l'emoved 
references to strict liability and joint and several liability as a compromise in order to pass 
CERCLA. See id. COUltS uniformly have held that CERCLA at least allows joint and several 
liability, and some have held that it should be imposed unless the defendant can establish 
a reasonable basis for apportionment. See id. at SOS. 
62See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (I) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
63See Rossman, supra note 5S, at 1I7-IS. 
64See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). 
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EPA under section 115.65 Thus, Congress empowered EPA to bring 
administrative or judicial enforcement actions against PRPs to force 
them to perform the remediation.66 Section 10467 of CERCIA author-
izes EPA to initiate the remediation of hazardous wastes at "release"68 
sites and section III allows EPA to pay for it out of the "Superfund. "69 
Section 1 07 allows EPA to recover its costs by bringing actions against 
PRPs.70 CERCIA also permits private parties to initiate the cleanup 
process themselves and to recover their costs under section 113.7I 
This system created by CERCIA is designed to increase the speed with 
which the environment is restored.72 
B. Defining the Process and Standards 
Underlying CERCIA's liability structure of imposing liability is 
the belief that those responsible for creating hazardous materials 
problems should bear the cleanup costS.73 Ultimately, EPA must estab-
lish processes, standards, and methods by which to effectuate this 
goal. 74 Mter identifYing hazardous substance release sites, CERCIA 
requires EPA to prioritize sites by hazard in the Hazard Ranking Sys-
tem (HRS).75 From the HRS, EPA establishes the NPL, which operates 
to ensure the sites that pose the greatest risk to human health and the 
environment are cleaned up first. 76 EPA periodically updates the NPL 
to account for information regarding new sites and the status of exist-
ing sites.77 
The National Contingency Plan (NCP) , section 105 of CER-
CIA,78 is a set of guidelines that prescribes the procedures and actions 
651d. § 9615. 
66See PLATER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 838. 
67See 42 U.S.C. § 9604. 
68See id. 
69See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Originally, tax-supported funding for 
the Hazardous Waste Response Fund ("Superfund") was to end in 1985, but SARA re-
funded it. See Keenan, supra note 17, at 459. 
7oSee 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (4)(A) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
71 See id. §§ 9613(f) (1),9607 (a)( 4) (B). 
72See Rossman, supra note 58, at 118. However, Plater notes that the entire process can 
take nearly twelve years between release and de-listing. See PLATER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 
843. 
73See Rossman, supra note 58, at 118. 
74See PLATER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 84l. 
75See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (8) (1994 & Supp, II 1996); see al50 PLATER, ET AL., supra note 
2, at 84l. 
76See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (a) (8); see also PLATER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 841. 
77See42 U.S.C. § 9605 (a) (8). 
7Bld. 
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to be taken in cleaning a particular site with hazardous substances 
upon it.79 Pursuant to the NCP, EPA is to "establish procedures and 
standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollut-
ants, and contaminants. "80 These procedures and standards must, at a 
minimum: (1) delineate methods for investigating, evaluating, and 
cleaning sites; (2) delegate the roles of the Federal, State, and local 
governments; and (3) ensure that remediation is cost-effective.81 
C. CERCLA's Response Authority 
CERCLA provides for two types of cleanup response authority: 
removal actions and remedial actions.82 Generally, '''removal' actions 
are primarily those intended for the short-term abatement of toxic 
waste hazards, while 'remedial' actions are typically those intended to 
restore long term environmental quality. "83 Subsection C.1 herein ad-
dresses governmental response authority and subsection C.2 ad-
dresses private party response authority. 
1. Government's Response Authority 
Whenever hazardous substances are released or a threat of re-
lease exists, the President and EPA have authority either to undertake 
remediation or removal consistent with the NCP.84 The government 
may invoke either the administrative process or the judicial process to 
restore the environment.85 For example, section 106 allows EPA, 
through the President's delegation, to issue an administrative order 
compelling a PRP to clean up a site. 86 The party compelled may then 
seek to recover its costs from other PRPs through section 107(a)(1)-
(4).87 
If, on the other hand, EPA prefers to initiate the process on its 
own rather than expending time and other valuable resources search-
ing for PRPs, it may do so using funds from the Superfund.88 Under 
79See PLATER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 835 11.15. 
8042 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
81Seeid. § 9605 (a)(I)-(7). 
82Seeid. § 9601(23), (24). 
83See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y 1986) (citing 
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985). 
84See RODGERS, supra note 50, at 687. 
85See Knedlik, supra note 50, at 368. 
86See42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
87Seeid. § 9607(a)(I)-(4), 9615. 
88See id. § 9611. 
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section 107(a) (4) (A), the government may then seek to recover "all 
costs of removal or remedial action"89 from the PRPs to replenish the 
fund. 90 Since liability is joint and several, the government can choose 
to recover from only one party,91 rather than expending resources to 
find other PRPs. In that case, the party held responsible might seek to 
avoid disproportionate cost bearing through common law contribu-
tion or indemnification actions against other PRPs.92 
2. Private Party's Response Authority 
Compared to the government, a private party is subject to stricter 
requirements when he or she attempts to recover response costs for 
voluntary cleanup initiatives.93 A private party may hold a PRP liable 
for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contingency plan,"94 but has the addi-
tional burden of proving its costs were "necessary. "95 
3. CERCIA's Broad Liability 
The liability for response costs under CERCIA is very broad and 
applies retroactively.96 Four categories of PRPs are subject to CER-
CIA's scope of environmental liability: (1) current owners and opera-
tors of a vessel or facility with hazardous wastes; (2) persons who 
owned or operated the facility at the time of disposal; (3) persons who 
arranged for the disposal, treatment, or transportation of the hazard-
ous substances that contaminated the facility; and (4) any person who 
accepts any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treat-
ment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person.97 
8942 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4)(A). 
90See id. §§ 9604(b), 9607(a) (1)-(4). 
91 See PLATER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 809. 
92See id. at 863 n.46. Plater remarks that CERCLA does not explicitly provide for strict, 
joint and several liability among PRPs. See id. at 807-08. All courts, however, uniformly 
have held CERLCA does impose such liability. See id. If the government seeks to recover its 
response costs, a PRP stands to be held liable for all those costs. See id. at 863. Thus, it may 
need to seek contribution from otller PRPs. See id. Although CERCLA also does not explic-
itly provide for indemnification, Plater suggests it is available through common law doc-
trines. See id. n.46. CERCLA does provide for contl'ibution in section 113 (f). See 42 U .S.C. 
§ 9613(f) (1) (1994 & Supp.1I 1996). 
93See Knedlik, supra note 50, at 369. 
9442 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). 
95See Knedlik, supra note 50, at 369. 
96See PLATER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 803. 
9742 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (1)-(4). 
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The liability imposed is consistent with CERClA's major purposes-to 
force responsible parties to internalize the costS.98 
4. Response Costs and Amount Recoverable 
Section 107 (a) (4) of CERClA states that a party which: 
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous sub-
stance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial 
action incurred by the United States Government or a State 
or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response in-
curred by any other person consistent with the national con-
tingency plan .... 99 
Subsection (A) deals with governmental cost recovery, whereas sub-
section (B) deals with private party cost recovery.1oo The definition of 
"respond" includes the terms "removal" and "remedial action."lOl 
Two textual differences exist between cost recovery provisions 
involving the government and those involving private parties.102 First, 
the government may recover "all costs" incurred by the government103 
while a private party may recover only "any other necessary costs" in-
curred by other persons.104 The government's response costs implic-
itly are presumed necessary and, consequently, recoverable, whereas 
private parties explicitly bear the burden of proving that the costs in-
curred are "necessary" for the response.105 The second textual differ-
ence is that the government's response cost must be "not inconsis-
tent" with the NCP,ro6 whereas a private party's response costs must be 
98See Knedlik, supra note 50, at 367. 
9942 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A)-(B). 
IOOSee Knedlik, supra note 50, at 369. 
IOISee 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (25). 'The terms 'respond' or 'response' means [sic] remove, 
removal, remedy, and remedial action;, [sic] all such terms (including the terms 'removal' 
and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related thereto." Id. Therefore, the 
difference between "costs of removal or remedial action" in subsection (A) and "costs of 
response" in subsection (B) is insignificant. See id. § 9607(a) (4) (A)-(B). 
102 Compare 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(A) ("all costs of removal or remedial action in-
curred by the ... Government ... not inconsistent with the national contingency plan") 
with id. § 9607(a) (4) (B) ("any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other 
person consistent with the national contingency plan"). 
I03See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A). 
I04Id. §9607(a)(4)(B). 
I05See Knedlik, supra note 50, at 369. 
10642 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
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"consistent" with the NCP.107 The difference in statutory language 
probably creates a presumption in favor of the government's response 
expenditures vis-a-vis a defendant,lOS while a private party seeking con-
tribution carries the burden of proving its response costs were consis-
tent with the NCP.109 
IV. CASELAW ON FEE SHIITING UNDER CERCLA 
Though the language differs between the two subsections, noth-
ing in CERCLA directly addresses whether attorneys' fees are recover-
able for a party, private or governmental, seeking to recover response 
costs. no Since CERCLA does not explicitly address whether attorneys' 
fees are recoverable, the statutory interpretation has been left to the 
judiciary. The Supreme Court's decision in Key Tronic Corp. v. United 
States111 addressed the recoverability of attorneys' fees by private par-
ties. The recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Chapman,ll2 ad-
dressed the recoverability of attorneys' fees by EPA and other gov-
ernmental agencies. 
A. Key Tronic 
1. Facts and Procedural Background 
In the late 1970s, Key Tronic Corporation (Key Tronic) and 
other parties, including the United States Air Force, disposed of liq-
uid c~emicals at the Colbert Landfill in eastern Washington.1l3 In 
1980, the Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE) found that 
the water supply deteriorated due to these chemicals and brought an 
action against Key Tronic, the Air Force, and other PRPs,l14 After Key 
Tronic settled with EPA and WDOE for $4.2 million, it brought an 
action to seek contribution from other PRPs under CERCLA sec-
107See id. § 9607(a)(4) (B). 
I08See New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 304 (N.D.N.Y 1984) (stating 
that defendant carries burden of proof to show government's costs were inconsistent with 
NCP). But see Bulk Distrib. Ctrs. Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (S.D. Fla. 
1984) (stating that government bears burden of proving costs not inconsistent with NCP). 
I09See J. Christopher Jordan, Note, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees in Private Cont1ibution Ac-
tions Pursuant to CERCLA Section 107(a)(4)(B), 10 REv. LITIG. 823, 827 (1991). 
11 0 See Knedlik, supra note 50, at 370. 
111511 U.S. 809 (1994). 
112146 F.3d 1166 (1998). 
I13See Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 811. 
1I4See id. 
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tion 113(£).115 Additionally, Key Tronic sought $1.2 million from other 
PRPs for response costs incurred before the settlement in a cost re-
covery claim under CERLCA section 107(a) (4) (B).116 Included in the 
$1.2 million were costs incurred by Key Tronic for the following legal 
services: (1) litigation expenses associated with prosecuting the costs 
of response recovery; (2) identifying other PRPs that were liable for 
the Colbert Landfill cleanup; and (3) preparing and negotiating the 
settlemen t. 117 
The district court ruled that Key Tronic could pursue the $1.2 
million cost of response recovery action under CERCLA sec-
tion 107(a) (4) (B).l1S Section 107(a) (4) (B) states that parties shall be 
liable for "necessary costs of response ... consistent with the national 
contingency plan. "119 Section 101 (25) defines "respond" as "remove, 
removal, remedy, and remedial action ... includ[ing] enforcement 
activities related thereto. "120 The district court construed sec-
tions 107(a) (4) (B) and 101 (25) "liberally so as to achieve the overall 
objectives of the statute. "121 The court ruled that private parties may 
incur costs for enforcement activities. 122 The court also ruled that at-
torneys' fees incurred in searching for other PRPs and negotiating the 
settlement were "necessary" under section 107.123 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision.124 The Cir-
cuit Court held that the district court lacked the authority to award 
attorneys' fees as "necessary."125 The Circuit Court relied upon its ear-
lier decision in Stanton Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises, where it 
held that a private party seeking to recover response costs from a 
party responsible for pollution was prohibited from obtaining attor-
neys' fees. 126 The Circuit Court interpreted CERCLA's language 
strictly, emphasizing that "Congress had not explicitly authorized pri-
vate litigants to recover their legal expenses incurred. "127 
115See id. 
1I6See id. at 812. 
117See id. 
lIBSee Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 865, 868 (E.D. Wash. 1991). 
II 9 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp.II 1996). 
12OId. § 9601 (25). 
121 See Key Tronie, 766 F. Supp. at 872. 
122See id. 
123See id. 
124See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 1993). 
125See id. at 1027. 
126See id. (citing Stanton Road Assocs. v. Lohrey Enterps., 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 
1993». 
127See id. at 1028. 
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2. The Supreme Court in Key Tronic 
Justice Stevens, delivering the opinion of the Court, identified 
the first issue in Key Tronic III as ''whether the fees for prosecuting this 
action against the Air Force are recoverable [by a private party] under 
CERCLA. "128 In order to decide this issue, the Court had to 
determine whether the phrase "enforcement activities" within the sec-
tion 10 1 (25) 129 definition of "response "130 included a private party's 
action to recover cleanup costs.l3l Thus, it had to determine whether 
private party attorneys' fees associated with that action would be 
within the "necessary costs of response" of section 107(a)(4)(B).132 
The Court also recognized that an award to recover private party at-
torneys' fees would have to be justified by CERCLA's language and 
intent, given the long-standing American Rule against fee shifting.133 
The Supreme Court categorized attorneys' fees into three 
groups: (1) fees incurred while prosecuting recovery actions; (2) fees 
incurred in non-litigation response related activities; and (3) fees in-
curred during negotiations with EPA.134 It then analyzed each of the 
three categories to see whether they fit within CERCLA's "necessary 
costs of response. "135 
As for attorneys' fees incurred while prosecuting recovery ac-
tions, the majority rejected, on three bases, Key Tronic's argument 
that the attorneys' fees in its recovery action against the Air Force 
were "enforcement activities. "136 The Court found that section 107 
merely implied a private party's costs of response recovery action,137 
thereby bringing the provision into conflict with the American Rule. 
The Court then reasoned that using an implied provision to create an 
exception to the American Rule "would be unusual if not unprece-
128See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. S09, S15 (1994). 
12942 U.S.C. § 1601(25) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
130Id. 
mSee Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at SI5-16. 
132See id. 
133See id. at SI4-15. 
134See id. at S12. 
135See generaUy Key Tronie, 511 U.S. at SI6-21. 
136See Key Tronie, 511 U.S. at SIS; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B) (stating that "costs 
of response" are recoverable by private party); id. § 9601 (25) (stating that "response" in-
cludes "enforcement activities"). 
mSee Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at S16. 
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dented" given the clarity of the American Rule. 138 The Court was not 
willing to stretch the Rule that far,139 
The Court also employed a structural argument based on CER-
CLA's language.140 Pointing out that Congress had omitted language 
expressly allowing recovery of attorneys' fees in section 
107(a) (4) (B) 141 while expressly providing for them in other sec-
tions,142 the Court found that Congress had in fact affirmatively de-
cided "not to authorize such awards. "143 Finally, the Court rejected 
Key Tronic's argument on the basis of the "plain meaning of the 
text. "144 According to the majority, it would torture its interpretation 
of "enforcement activities" to squeeze within it a private action to re-
cover attorneys' fees. 145 
As for the second category of attorneys' fees sought by Key 
Tro nic , non-litigation attorneys' fees, the Court held that these costs 
were recoverable if "closely tied to the actual cleanup"l46 under sec-
tion 107. The Court followed the Tenth Circuit's decision in FMC 
Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., holding that non-litigation fees are an ex-
ception to the American Rule,147 Key Tronic argued that attorneys' 
fees used to find PRPs "benefit the entire process" and should there-
fore be recoverable,148 The Court agreed and found a distinction be-
tween litigation fees and non-litigation fees, reasoning that any num-
ber of professionals might perform PRP-searching, which may include 
attorneys.149 Therefore, non-litigation fees incurred by a private 
party's attorney in searching for other PRPs were distinguishable from 
attorneys' fees incurred in litigating the cost recovery action.150 
The third category of attorneys' fees the Court analyzed in Key 
Tronic related to negotiating its settlement with EPA.151 Key Tronic 
138See id. at 818. 
139See id. at 819. 
140See id. at 818-19. 
141 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4)(B) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
142See, e.g., id. § 961O(c) ("Whenever an order is issued under this section to abate such 
violation, at the request of the applicant a sum equal to the aggregate amount of all costs 
and expenses (including attorney's fees) determined by the Secretary of Labor .... "). 
143Ktry Tronic, 511 U.S. at 818-19. 
144See id. at 819. 
145See id. 
146See id. at 820. 
147See id. at 820-21 (citing FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 847 
(1993)). 
148See Ktry Tronic, 511 U.S. at 820-21. 
149See id. 
150See id. 
151 See id. 
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argued that attorneys' fees incurred in preparing studies for negotiat-
ing the consent decree that were ultimately used in the cleanup proc-
ess were "closely tied to the actual cleanup. "152 The Court held that 
attorneys' fees incurred in settling consent decrees were unrecover-
able in a private party recovery action under section 107.153 It rea-
soned that Key Tronic prepared the studies to limit its scope of liabil-
ity, rather than to "benefit the entire cleanup. "154 
By interpreting its provisions broadly, the Court declined to util-
ize a canon of construction that would further CERClA's purposes.l55 
Rather, the Court relied upon the plain terms of the phrase "en-
forcement activities" to conclude that Congress had not expressed a 
clear intention to shift fees. 156 
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, criticized the majority's reasoning 
and conclusions.157 He chastised them for characterizing the right of 
cost recovery as "implied. "158 According to Scalia, the provision that 
"covered persons ... shall be liable for ... necessary costs of response 
incurred by any other person"159 created an express right of recov-
ery.l60 He also criticized them for requiring a "magic phrase" to effec-
tuate Congress' intent.161 Finally, he attacked the majority for inter-
preting "enforcement activities" so strictly as to deprive it of any 
meaning in its context.162 Although he concurred that the non-
152See Key Tronie, 511 U.S. 809 at 820-2l. 
153See id. 
154See id. 
155See id. at 817-18. The remedial purpose canon of construction is discussed more 
fully infra Part IV.A.2. 
156See Key Tronie, 511 U.S. at 819. 
157 See John R. Casciano, Comment, Key Tronic Corporation v. United States: A New 
Standard Nan-ows the Scope of the American Rule as Applied to CERCLA Private Contribution Ac-
tions, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 407, 433-34 (1996).-
158See Key Tronie, 511 U.S. at 822 (Scalia,]., dissenting in part). 
15942 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (8) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
looSee Key Tronie, 511 U.S. at 824 (Scalia,]., dissenting in part). Justice Scalia supported 
his contention with CERClA's language and structure. See id. For example, section 
107 (a)( 4) (D) refers to "amounts recoverable in an action under this section." See id. (para-
phrasing 42 U.S.c. §9607(a)(4)(D)). Also, section 113 refers to a "civil action ... under 
section [107(a) J." See id. at 822 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1)). 
161See id. at 823 (Scalia,]., dissenting in part). Scalia discussed the need to satisty Run-
yon v. MeRary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976), which requires a determination that Congress 
intended to shift fees. See id. at 823. Scalia argued that Congress needs to be explicit, not to 
incant any magic phrase. See id. 
162See id. at 824 (Scalia,]., dissenting in part). Justice Scalia acknowledged that "en-
forcement" usually sounds in governmental prosecution, but argued that such an interpre-
tation is not exclusive. See id. For example, Scalia argued, lawyers and courts often refer to 
"enforceable contracts" and the Clayton Act has been described as "a vehicle for private 
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litigation attorneys' fees were recoverable,163 Scalia thought private 
parties should also be able to recover attorneys' fees associated with 
litigation and negotiation. l64 
Since Key Tronic dealt with private party attorneys' fees, it did not 
resolve whether government's attorneys' fees are recoverable under 
section 107(a) (4) (A).165 In Key Tronic, the Supreme Court expressly 
refused to offer "comment on the extent to which [the] phrase ['en-
forcement activities'] forms the basis for the Government's recovery 
of attorneys' fees."166 However, the Court did not rule out the possibil-
ity that it might have to decide the question later.167 
B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision in United States v. Chapman168 
1. Facts and Procedural Background 
In United States v. Chapman, Harold B. Chapman, Jr. manufac-
tured small metal collars, and stored and resold surplus chemicals on 
his five-acre parcel of land in Palomino Valley, Washoe County, Ne-
vada.169 In 1989, Washoe County requested that EPA investigate the 
site,l7° Ecology & Environment (E&E) was hired to inspect and pho-
tograph the site in October.l7l 
On December 20, 1989, EPA's On Scene Coordinator (OSC), 
Robert Bornstein, conducted a preliminary assessment of the site,l72 
Mr. Bornstein found approximately 2000 5-gallon containers holding 
a wide assortment of known chemicals, oil, and paint.173 Approxi-
mately 100 55-gallon drums of unknown substances were present as 
well.l74 Most of the drums were stored outside, and the soil was visibly 
enforcement of the law" in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 u.s. 104, 109 (1986). 
Id. Moreover, argued Scalia, the "private enforcement" label seems appropriate in sec-
tion 107 because plaintiffs under that section have to be consistent with the NCP. See Key 
Tronic, 511 U.S. at 824 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4)(B)). 
163See Key Tronie, 511 U.S. at 821 (Scalia,]., dissenting in part). 
164See id. at 824. 
16542 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4)(A) (1994 & Stipp. II 1996). 
166See Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 819. 
167See id. 
168146 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1998). 




173See Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1168. 
174See id. 
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stained from substances leaking out of deteriorated containers.175 Af-
ter E&E found that a sample of the substances exhibited qualities of 
flammability, corrosivity, and combustibility, Washoe County at-
tempted to force Chapman to comply with the cleanup order.176 The 
County issued Chapman a misdemeanor citation, revoked his business 
license, and asked for assistance from EPAp7 
Using its power under section 106, EPA issued an Administrative 
Order compelling Chapman to take immediate action to secure the 
site and contain (or prevent) the release of hazardous substancesP8 
He was to submit site security and safety plans, a detailed work plan, 
and remove any hazardous substancesP9 
In January 1991, Mr. Bornstein again investigated Chapman's 
property and found several hundred 1- to 5-gallon containers of waste 
and flammable liquids. I8o He also found approximately fifty 55-gallon 
drums containing flammable liquids. 181 Since Chapman failed to 
comply with the Administrative Order, EPA initiated a response action 
according to CERClA by determining what actions would be neces-
sary to remove the hazardous substances.182 
In February 1991, Chapman began to comply with the Adminis-
trative Order and, under the supervision of EPA and E&E, removed 
the containers from the site and submitted soil samples to EPA.183 EPA 
incurred response costs totaling approximately $34,000.184 EPA sent 
letters demanding that Chapman reimburse EPA for the $34,000 it 
had incurred.185 Chapman resisted.186 The United States then brought 
an action in district court against Chapman to recover response 
costS.I87 The district court judge granted summary judgment in favor 
ofthe United States.188 Chapman appealed to the Ninth Circuit.189 
175See id. 
176See id. 
177See id. at 1169. 
178See Chaprnan, 146 F.3d at 1169. 
179See id. 
181JSee id. 
181 See id. 
182See id. 





188See Chaprnan, 146 F.3d at 1169. 
189See id. 
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2. The Ninth Circuit in Chapman 
The Ninth Circuit first concluded that the district court had not 
erred in holding that EPA had established a prima facie case which 
Chapman failed to rebut and that EPA's response action was "not in-
consistent" with the NCP.190 It next turned to the question of whether 
EPA was entitled to recover its attorneys' fees as part of its response 
costs.191 Based on statutory language and public policy, the court con-
cluded that EPA could recover attorneys' fees related to litigating its 
recovery action, but the court limited the amount recoverable.192 
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that under the 
American Rule, attorneys' fees are generally not recoverable "absent 
explicit congressional authorization. "193 The court distinguished the 
language in section 107(a) (4) (A), which allows government to re-
cover response costs, from that in section 107 (a) (4) (B), which allows 
a private party to recover response costs.194 It reasoned that because 
"respond" is defined in section 101 (25) to mean "remove, removal, 
remedy or remedial action" including "enforcement activities,"l95 the 
government's recoverable costs include not only remedial costs, but 
also attorneys' fees.l96 It also rested its conclusion on the broad lan-
guage in CERCIA.197 Language in section 107 (a) (4) (A) making par-
ties liable for "all costs of removal"198 and in section 104(b) allowing 
the government to "undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, economic, 
engineering or architectural, and other studies or investigations ... to 
recover the costs"199 helped convince the court that CERCIA 
specifically allows for the recovery of attorneys' fees. 2oo Further, the 
court relied upon Justice Scalia's dissent in Key Tronic to conclude that 
1905ee id. at 1173. 
1915ee id. The district court held that the government was entitled to attorneys' fees at-
tributable to litigating the recovery action. See id. 
1925ee id. at 1176. Although agreeing with the district court that EPA could recover its 
attorneys' fees, the circuit court vacated the district court's award and remanded it for a 
test of reasonableness. See id. 
1935ee Chapman, 146 F.3d at II73 (citing Runyon v. McRary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976) 
and Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975». 
1945ee id. at II 73-74 n.8. 
19542 U.S.C. § 9601 (25) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
100See Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1174. 
1975ee id. 
19842 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
199Id. § 9604(b). 
200See Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1174. 
798 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:779 
Congress did not have to use the term "attorneys'. fees" to evince its 
intent that they should be included.201 
The Ninth Circuit recognized public policy as a relevant consid-
eration because "Congress intended to 'facilitate the prompt cleanup 
of hazardous waste sites by placing the ultimate financial responsibil-
ity for cleanup on those responsible for hazardous waste.'"202 The 
court relied on CERCIA's remedial purpose to justity considering 
general policy reasons to award the government attorneys' fees. 203 It 
declared that CERCIA's purpose is to clean the environment; thus, 
liberally construing its provisions furthers that purpose.204 The court, 
then, recognized CERCIA's remedial purpose and construed its 
terms broadly consistent with that purpose.205 Further, awarding at-
torneys' fees could deter both contamination and delaying clean-
ups.206 
In Chapman, the Ninth Circuit imposed a "reasonableness" limit 
on the amount of attorneys' fees EPA can recover in a response cost 
recovery action.207 EPA's costs of actual cleanup, disregarding the liti-
gation, were $34,000, but the litigation expenses incurred in pursuing 
those costs were over $400,000.208 The court remanded the case for a 
finding of whether the attorneys' costs were reasonable.209 
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED CERCIA 
AND KEy TRONIC TO ALLOW FOR RECOVERY OF GoVERNMENTAL 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
A. Statutory Authority for Fee Shifting Under CERCLA 
1. Express Statutory Language of CERCIA 
The textual provisions of CERCIA dealing with government cost 
recovery are sufficiently clear to create a legislative exception to the 
American Rule.210 The argument allowing government plaintiffs to 
201See id. 
202See id. at 1175 (quoting Washington Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 
Pacificorp, 59 F.3d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1995». 
203See id. 
204See id. 
205See Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1175. 
206See id. at 1175-76. 
207 See id. at 11 76. 
20IISee id. 
209See id. 
21°See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 (a) (4) (A), 9604(b) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
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recover costs of response is based on the contention that sec-
tion 107(a)(4) (A)'s "costs of removal or remedial action"211 encom-
pass attorneys' fees through sections 101 (23)212 and 104(b).213 
CERCLA section 101 (23)214 defines a removal action with refer-
ence to section 104 (b). 215 Section 104 (b) expressly allows the gov-
ernment, through the President and EPA, to "undertake such plan-
ning, legal ... and other studies as [it] may deem necessary or 
appropriate . . . to recover the costs [of response actions]. "216 Thus, 
these sections should be read as allowing the government, usually act-
ing through EPA, to recover costs for all its investigation and en-
forcement activities, including legal work. 217 
Further textual support is found in CERCLA section 
107(a)(4)(A), which makes "all costs" recoverable by a government 
plaintiff in a removal or remedial response action.218 Although this 
section does not use the term "respond,"219 section 101 (25) defines 
"respond" as a removal or remedial action, and includes "enforce-
ment activities related thereto. "220 Since attorneys' fees associated with 
litigating response cost recovery are "enforcement activities related" 
Id. 
211Id. § 9607(a) (4)(A). 
212Id. § 9601 (23). "Remove" means: 
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances into the environ-
ment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the 
release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the tak-
ing of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or miti-
gate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which 
may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in 
addition, without being limited to, security fencing, or other measures to 
limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and 
housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action under 
section 9404(b) [CERClA section I04(b) 1 of this title, and any emergency as-
sistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency As-
sistance Act. 
2UId. § 9604(b) (stating "the President may undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, 
economic, engineering, architectural, and other studies or investigations as he may deem 
necessary or appropriate to plan and direct response actions, to recover the costs thereof, 
and to enforce the provisions of this chapter"). 
214ld. § 9601 (23). 
215See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
216Id. 
217See Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1175. 
218See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A) (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see also Chapman, 146 F.3d at 
1175. 
21942 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A). 
22OId. § 9601 (25). 
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thereto,221 the term "enforcement activities" would be superfluous if 
not interpreted to include activities that compel a PRP to internalize 
the cost of polluting.222 To give plain meaning to CERClA's terms 
without rendering "enforcement activities" superfluous requires a 
broad reading of "enforcement activities."223 Enforcement activities 
should include the legal expenses incurred by EPA in trying to re-
cover its response costs under section l07(a) (4) (A).224 Therefore, in 
the context of government plaintiffs trying to recover costs associated 
with litigating response cost recovery, the text of CERClA supports 
fee shifting. 225 
Moreover, while Congress did not use the terms "attorneys' fees" 
or "legal expenses," it should not be required to do so to evince an 
intent to shift attorneys' fees to a PRP.226 Since Congress used the 
phrase "enforcement activities" and these activities primarily include 
attorneys' fees, the text is sufficiently clear to avoid the application of 
the American Rule.227 
2. Remedial Purpose Canon of Construction 
CERClA is generally seen as a remedial statute and should be 
interpreted with this purpose in mind.228 The remedial purpose 
canon of construction states that remedial legislation should be con-
strued liberally to effectuate the beneficial purpose for which it was 
enacted.229 Since all legislation is theoretically remedial,230 the reme-
221See B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 528 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom., 
Zollo Drum Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 118 S.Ct. 2318 (1998). 
222See Mullins, supra note 12, at 1530. 
223See id. 
224See id. 
225See Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1175. 
226See Key Tronic Corp. v. Unites States, 511 U.S. 809, 815 (1994) (stating that "absence 
of specific reference to attorney's fees is not dispositive if the statute evinces an intent to 
provide for such fees"); see also id. at 823 (Scalia,]., dissenting in part) (Congress need not 
incan t the magic phrase "attorney's fees") . 
227 See id. at 823 (Scalia,]., dissenting in part). 
228Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: 
Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 199, 262-63 
(1996). 
229See id. at 201. 
230Rudolph H. Heimanson, &medial Legislation, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 216, 216 (1962). De-
lineating which statutes are "remedial" is the source of much scholarship. See, e.g., id.; 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 289 (1985); Max Radin, 
Statut01Y Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 869-81 (1930); Antonin Scalia, Assorted Ca-
nards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 581, 583 (1989-1990). An in-
depth discussion of these theories, however, is beyond the scope of this Commen t. 
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dial purpose canon has become a post-hoc explanation for the pur-
pose of construing a statute's terms broadly.231 It is most often invoked 
when the underlying statute is curative in nature.232 
Courts look at many factors when determining whether to em-
ploy the remedial purpose canon.233 For example, courts have looked 
at the intrinsic nature of the legislation, its legislative history, as well 
as its text and structure, but these factors are by no means exclusive.234 
Lower courts have almost universally held that CERCLA is reme-
dial in nature.235 In fact, every circuit that has considered CERCLA 
has analyzed it using the remedial purpose canon as an interpretive 
principle.236 In light of CERCLA's legislative history, structural 
scheme, and congressional intent, use of the remedial purpose canon 
is justified as an interpretive tooP37 A liberal interpretation to effec-
tuate CERCLA's remedial purpose in accordance with the canon 
would hold that Congress intended CERCLA to create a legislative 
exception to the American Rule that would allow fee shifting. 
CERCLA is an excellent candidate for the application of the re-
medial purpose canon.238 It has been characterized as "overwhelm-
ingly remedial,"239 and its history and structure indicate that courts 
should give a liberal construction to its terms in order to effectuate its 
goals.24o CERCLA's overriding purpose is to protect human health 
and the environment from the dangers posed by hazardous sub-
231See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statut01~Y Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 921, 936--38 (1992). 
232See id. at 938. For example, courts have invoked the canon when construing laws en-
acted to protect the public against socially detrimental business practices, such as antitrust, 
securities, and unfair competition. See Watson, supra note 228, at 236--37. 
233See Watson, supra note 228, at 238-40. 
234See id. 
235See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 865, 871 (E.D. Wash. 1991), 
reo'd, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1993), aJJ'd, 511 U.S. 809 (1994). The District Court in Key 
Tronic characterized CERCLA as "a remedial statute designed by Congress to protect and 
preserve public health and the environment." Id. 
236See Watson, supra note 228, at 262-63. 
237See, e.g., United States v. Northeast Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 
F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986), cat. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (providing a structural 
justification for the use of the remedial purpose canon in CERCLA cases by concluding 
that the statutory scheme itself is "overwhelmingly remedial"); United States V. Reilly Tar & 
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (reading CERCLA aggressively by 
holding that it should be given a broad and liberal construction to give effect to Congress' 
desire for a prompt and effective remediation of hazardous waste sites). 
238See Watson, supra note 228, at 271-72. 
239NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 733. 
240SeeWatson, supra note 228, at 271-72. 
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stances.241 Further, it accomplishes this in two ways: (1) enabling more 
expeditious cleanup of toxic spills; and (2) allocating the costs of 
cleanup to those responsible for the harm.242 
CERClA is, by its nature, more remedial than other non-penal 
statutes.243 Its fundamental focus is to remedy the harmful effects of 
hazardous substance releases to protect human health and the envi-
ronment. 244 Rather than regulating future actions by requiring com-
pliance with regulatory standards, CERClA imposes liability on past 
actions.245 Contrasted with the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) ,246 which regulates storage, transportation, and disposal 
of hazardous wastes via a permitting system, CERClA in no way di-
rectly regulates future behavior by standard setting or permitting.247 
Additionally, congressional intent, as documented in the legisla-
tive history of S. 1480 (one of the bills that eventually constituted 
CERClA), indicated that Congress wanted CERClA to be remedial in 
nature. 248 Although the majority of its most controversial features 
were deleted, what survived was the remedial focus. 249 "The basic con-
cept of creating response authority and a response fund to prevent 
and remedy health and environmental threats from releases or 
241See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
242SeeB.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89,94 (D. Conn. 1988). 
243See Watson, supra note 228, at 271. 
244See WILLIAM MURRAY TABB & LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: CASES AND 
MATERiALS 637 (1992). The authors note that: 
[tlhe Act is distinctive in the spectrum of federal environmental protective legislation 
in that the principal focus is remedial and corrective rather than regulatory. CERCLA does 
not set standards for prospective compliance by industry but essentially is a tort-like, back-
ward-looking statute designed to cleanup expeditiously abandoned hazardous waste sites 
and respond to hazardous spills and releases of toxic wastes into the environment. 
Id. 
245See id.; see also United States v. Northeast Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co. (NEPACCO), 
810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (citing retrospective na-
ture of CERCLA as main reason to characterize as "overwhelmingly remedial"); New York 
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that "CERCLA is not a 
regulatory standard-setting statute such as the Clean Air Act"). 
24642 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
247See United States V. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 263 n.19 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(acknowledging that CERCLA is remedial while RCRA is regulatory) . 
248See Watson, supra note 228, at 290. The leading Senate bill under consideration was 
expressly characterized as "remedial legislation." S. Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Congo 2d Sess. 
36, 37 (1980), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRON-
MENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND) 343, 344 
(Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY l. 
249See Watson, supra note 228, at 290-91. 
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threatened releases of hazardous substances is the same in both the 
House and Senate version of H.R. 7020. "250 
3. Remedial Purpose and Legislative Intent in Enacting CERCLA 
CERCLA's fundamental purposes are to provide for the rapid 
cleanup of hazardous materials release in order to protect human 
health and the environment, and to impose the costs of cleanups 
upon the PRP.251 The legislative history indicates congressional intent 
to further CERCLA's goals by making the scope of liability more in-
clusive.252 
When SARA was enacted in 1986,253 part of it modified the 
definition of "response" explicitly to include "enforcement activi-
ties. "254 The Conference Committee commented that the purpose of 
the amendment was to clarifY that "such costs are recoverable from 
responsible parties, as removal and remedial costs under sec-
tion lO7. "255 Although Congress explicitly provided for attorneys' fees 
in other portions of SARA,256 it does not follow that its failure to use 
identical language in section 107 suggests a decision not to shift 
fees. 257 According to Justice Scalia, "enforcement activities" unambi-
guously refers to attorneys' fees, and Congress therefore did not need 
to mention them by name.258 
Also, by redefining "response" in SARA, Congress endorsed the 
lower courts' interpretation of CERCLA to allow EPA to recover its 
attorneys' fees. 259 Arguably, if Congress had disapproved of such in-
250126 CONGo REc. 31,965 (Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio), reprinted in 1 
CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 779. 
251See Dennis]. Byrne, Note, Stanton Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises: The American 
Rule Precludes an Award of Attorney's Fees in Private-Party CERCLA Cost Recovery Actions, 24 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 577, 586 (1994). 
252See Casciano, supra note 157, at 411-12 (1996) (stating that SARA amendments cre-
ated an express cause of action for private parties). 
253See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. II 
1996)). 
254See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). 
255See H.R. CONF. REp. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,3278. 
256See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (pl'Oviding fOi' "reasonable at-
torney and expert witness fees" to prevailing party). 
257See Key Tl'Onic Corp v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 823 (1994) (Scalia,]., dissenting 
in part). 
258See id. 
259See id. at 817. 
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terpretation, it would have restricted the scope of liability to exclude 
shifting attorneys' fees. 
Awarding attorneys' fees to EPA furthers both of CERCU's over-
riding purposes.260 Courts must effectuate congressional purpose in 
accordance with Alyeska's mandate that courts not substitute their own 
judgment for that of the legislature.261 Shifting fees helps protect hu-
man health and environment by encouraging PRPs to undertake the 
cleanup process rather than relying on EPA, thereby conserving EPA 
resources for cleaning sites that have no identified PRP.262 It also 
promotes the principle that the polluter must pay.263 If EPA faces un-
compensated litigation fees from pursuing a costs of response recov-
ery action, the polluter will not have internalized all the costs associ-
ated with the remediation or remova1. 264 
B. Public Policy 
Policy objectives support awarding attorneys' fees in cost recovery 
actions by the government.265 The Ninth Circuit in Chapman sup-
ported its conclusion that EPA could recover its attorneys' fees by 
pointing out that awarding attorneys' fees could act as a powerful de-
terrent to similarly situated polluters.266 The court reasoned that pol-
luters such as Chapman, when faced with the added liability of attor-
neys' fees, would be more likely to undertake the cleanup process 
themselves.267 Providing incentive for PRPs to clean up hazardous 
substance releases not only reduces the number of actions EPA must 
bring to recover its cost, but also reduces the burden on the judicial 
system.268 PRPs faced with the possibility of paying EPA's attorneys' 
fees might consider more carefully the merits of resisting the action to 
recover costs.269 
, 2°OCf Keenan, supra note 17, at 473 (arguing that shifting fees in private party re-
sponse cost recovery actions furthers CERCLA's two main goals). 
261See Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975). 
262See Knedlik, supra note 50, at 386. 
263See id. at 385. 
264See id. 
265See United States v. Chapman, 146 F.3d 1166, 1175 (9th Cir. 1998). 
266See id. at 1175-76. 
267See id. 
268Knedlik, supra note 50, at 386. 
269See id. 
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The court in Chapman also intimated that fee shifting might ac-
tually deter hazardous substance releases.27o Imposing attorneys' fees 
upon the responsible party increases the liability facing polluters and 
helps ensure that polluters pay all of the cleanup costs.271 Were the 
government prohibited from collecting its attorneys' fees, imposition 
of cleanup costs on the responsible party would be undermined.272 
CONCLUSION 
CERCLA does not specifically address whether plaintiffs seeking 
to recover their costs of response may recover their attorneys' fees. In 
1994, the Supreme Court in Key Tronic interpreted section 
107 (a) (4) (B) to conclude that Congress had not provided enough 
evidence of its intent to create a legislative exception to the American 
Rule against fee shifting for private party plaintiffs. Since then, the 
recoverability of EPA's attorneys' fees has been questionable because 
the Supreme Court intimated that it might yet have to decide that 
question. 
Although courts have been reluctant to shift fees in light of Su-
preme Court precedent mandating express legislative authority, 
CERCLA's history, text, and purpose provide the judiciary with 
enough evidence to find that Congress indeed wanted to impose costs 
upon polluters. Furthermore, public policy justifies shifting fees to 
polluters when EPA seeks to recover its costs of response under CER-
CLA section 107(a) (4) (A). 
For example, the language of CERCLA's provisions suggest that 
the term "enforcement activities" must include response activities be-
sides remediation and removal, and it is reasonable to conclude that 
these other activities would include the litigation expenses involved in 
seeking contribution or indemnification from a PRP. Further, given 
the uniformity with which CERCLA has been held as a remedial stat-
ute, its terms should be construed broadly consistent with that pur-
pose under the remedial purpose canon of construction. As CER-
CLA's goals are to effectuate environmental restoration while 
imposing the costs of doing so on those who are responsible for re-
leasing pollutants, requiring a polluter to pay for the government's 
attorneys' fees when it is forced to litigate is consistent with these 
270See Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1176 (stating that "[fee shifting] might even encourage re-
sponsible parties not to pollute and contaminate property in the first place"). 
271 See Mullins, supra note 12, at 1532. 
272See id. 

